כריתות יב

כריתות יב

אֶלָּא לָאו בְּחַד, וְקָתָנֵי כִּי אֵין מַכְחִישָׁן מְהֵימַן, שְׁמַע מִינָּה.

Rather, isn’t the baraita referring to a case of one witness, and it teaches that when he does not contradict the testimony of the witness, the witness is deemed credible? Learn from it that one witness can render a person liable to bring a sin offering if the person does not contradict the testimony.

אָמַר רַבִּי מֵאִיר: קַל וָחוֹמֶר.

§ The mishna teaches that if two witnesses say that someone ate forbidden fat, and he denies it, Rabbi Meir deems him liable to bring a sin offering. Rabbi Meir said: This conclusion can be inferred a fortiori: If two witnesses could have brought him liability to receive the severe punishment of death, can they not bring him liability to sacrifice an offering, which is relatively lenient? The Rabbis said to him: Witnesses are unable to render another person liable to bring an offering contrary to his statement, as what if he wishes to say: I did so intentionally, in which case he would be exempt from bringing an offering?

איבעיא להו: מאי טעמייהו דרבנן, משום דאדם נאמן על עצמו יותר ממאה איש, או דלמא משום דאמרינן: מיגו דאי בעי אמר ״מזיד הייתי״ – פטור, כי אמר נמי ״לא אכלתי״ – מהימן ופטור?

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the reasoning of the Rabbis, who deem him exempt from bringing an offering? Is it because they hold that a person is deemed credible about himself more than the testimony of one hundred people? Or perhaps it is because we say that since he could advance a more advantageous claim [miggo], in that if he wishes, he could say: I did so intentionally, in which case he would be exempt from bringing an offering, therefore, also when he says: I did not eat, he is deemed credible and is exempt.

ומאי נפקא מינה? למיפשט מינה לטומאה, דאי אמרת טעמייהו דרבנן משום דאדם נאמן על עצמו יותר ממאה איש – לא שנא טומאה חדשה ולא שנא טומאה ישנה.

The Gemara asks: And what is the practical difference between the two possibilities? The Gemara answers: The difference is whether it is possible to resolve from it the case of ritual impurity, when witnesses testify that one became ritually impure before entering the Temple, and he claims that he did not become impure. If you say that the Rabbis’ reasoning is that a person is deemed credible about himself more than the testimony of one hundred people, then it is no different if it is a case of new impurity, where they testify that he became impure the day he entered the Temple, and it is no different if it is a case of old impurity, where they testify that he became impure at some earlier date. In either case, the person’s claim that he was not impure when he entered the Temple would be deemed credible.

ואי אמרת טעמיהון דרבנן משום דאמר ״מיגו״ היא – פטרי ליה רבנן מטומאה ישנה, אבל מטומאה חדשה מחייב. מאי טעמא? טומאה ישנה, מיגו דאי בעי אמר ״טבלתי״ – פטור, כי אמר נמי ״לא נטמאתי״ – פטור, דאיכא למימר: מאי ״לא נטמאתי״ דקאמר – לא עמדתי בטומאתי אלא טבלתי.

But if you say that the reasoning of the Rabbis is that he can say miggo, then the Rabbis would deem him exempt from the obligation to bring a sliding-scale offering in a case of old impurity, but in a case of new impurity he would be obligated to bring a sliding-scale offering. What is the reason? With regard to old impurity, since if he wishes, he could say: I immersed in a ritual bath after becoming impure and at sunset I became ritually pure, in which case he would be exempt from bringing an offering for having entered the Temple the following day, then also when he says: I did not become impure, he is exempt, as it can be said: What does he mean when he says: I did not become impure? He means: I did not remain in my state of impurity, but rather I immersed in a ritual bath.

אבל טומאה חדשה – מחייב, מאי טעמא? דכי אמר נמי ״טבלתי״ – מחייב, דאמרו ליה עדים: השתא נטמאת.

But in a case of new impurity, he would be obligated to bring an offering. What is the reason? It is because even when he says: I immersed in a ritual bath, he would be obligated to bring an offering if he entered the Temple, as the witnesses would say to him: You became impure just now, and you could not have purified yourself in the meantime.

מאי? תא שמע: אמר לו עד אחד: נטמאת, והוא אומר: לא נטמאתי – פטור. יכול אפילו שנים? אמר רבי מאיר: קל וחומר, אם הביאוהו שנים למיתה חמורה – לא יביאוהו לידי קרבן הקל? וחכמים אומרים: אדם נאמן על עצמו יותר ממאה איש. שמע מינה טעמייהו דרבנן משום דאמרי: אדם נאמן על עצמו יותר ממאה איש.

What, then, is the reasoning of the Rabbis? The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a baraita: If one witness said to a person: You became impure, and he says: I did not become impure, he is exempt from bringing an offering. One might have thought this is the halakha even where two witnesses said this. Rabbi Meir said: This conclusion can be inferred a fortiori: If two witnesses could have brought him liability to receive the severe punishment of death, can they not bring him liability to bring an offering, which is relatively lenient? And the Rabbis say: A person is deemed credible about himself more than the testimony of one hundred people. The Gemara explains its suggestion: Learn from the baraita that the reasoning of the Rabbis is that they say that a person is deemed credible about himself more than the testimony of one hundred people.

אָמַר רַבִּי אַמֵּי: לְעוֹלָם טַעְמָא דְּרַבָּנַן מִשּׁוּם דְּאָמְרִינַן ״מִיגּוֹ״, וְהָכִי קָתָנֵי: מִתּוֹךְ שֶׁאִם רָצָה לוֹמַר: לֹא עָמַדְתִּי בְּטוּמְאָתִי – פָּטוּר, הִילְכָּךְ אָדָם נֶאֱמָן עַל עַצְמוֹ יוֹתֵר מִמֵּאָה אִישׁ. אִי הָכִי, הַיְינוּ חֵלֶב!

Rabbi Ami said: Actually, the Rabbis’ reasoning is that we say miggo, and this is what it is teaching: Since if he wished to say: I did not remain in my state of impurity but rather I immersed, then he would be exempt, therefore a person is deemed credible about himself more than the testimony of one hundred people. The Gemara asks: If so, this case is identical to that of eating forbidden fat, which the mishna already discussed.

מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: ״אָכַלְתִּי חֵלֶב״, קָמְתָרֵיץ דִּיבּוּרֵיהּ: לָא אָכַלְתִּי שׁוֹגֵג אֶלָּא מֵזִיד, אֲבָל: נִטְמֵאתָ, וְהוּא אוֹמֵר: לֹא נִטְמֵאתִי, אֵימָא לָא קָמְתָרֵיץ דִּבּוּרֵיהּ, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן: הָכָא נָמֵי: לֹא עָמַדְתִּי בְּטוּמְאָתִי אֲבָל טָבַלְתִּי.

The Gemara explains that the baraita mentions the case of ritual impurity lest you say the following: When he says: I did not eat forbidden fat, he may explain his statement to mean: I did not eat forbidden fat unwittingly but intentionally, and I am therefore not obligated to bring an offering. But if two witnesses say: You have become impure, and he says: I have not become impure, one might say that he cannot explain his statement in a manner that would exempt him, as it makes no difference whether he became impure unwittingly or intentionally. Therefore, the baraita teaches us that here too, he can explain his statement in a different manner: I did not remain in my state of impurity, but rather I immersed, and he is therefore not obligated to bring an offering.

תָּא שְׁמַע: ״וְהִתְוַדָּה״ – מוֹדֶה בַּדְּבָרִים – חַיָּיב, אֵין מוֹדֶה בַּדְּבָרִים – פָּטוּר. אָמַר לוֹ עֵד אֶחָד: נִטְמֵאתָ, וְהוּא אוֹמֵר: לֹא נִטְמֵאתִי – פָּטוּר.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear an explanation of the opinion of the Rabbis from another baraita, which discusses the case of the defiling of the Temple, by entering it while ritually impure, or its sacrificial foods, by partaking of them while ritually impure one who enters the Temple or eats sacred foods in a state of ritual impurity: The Torah states: “And it shall be, when he shall be guilty of one of these things, that he shall confess…and he shall bring…for a sin offering” (Leviticus 5:5–6). This verse indicates that only one who confesses to sinning is liable to bring a sin offering, whereas one who does not confess is exempt from bringing a sin offering. If one witness said to him: You have become impure, and he says: I have not become impure, he is exempt from bringing a sin offering.

יָכוֹל אֲפִילּוּ שְׁנַיִם מַכְחִישִׁין? אָמַר רַבִּי מֵאִיר: אִם הֱבִיאוּהוּ שְׁנַיִם לִידֵי מִיתָה חֲמוּרָה, לֹא יְבִיאוּהוּ לִידֵי קׇרְבָּן הַקַּל? רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: נֶאֱמָן אָדָם עַל עַצְמוֹ יוֹתֵר מִמֵּאָה אִישׁ.

One might have thought even in a case where two witnesses contradict him, he is exempt from bringing an offering. Rabbi Meir said: If two witnesses could have brought him liability to receive the severe punishment of death, can they not bring him liability to bring an offering, which is relatively lenient? Rabbi Yehuda says: A person is deemed credible about himself more than the testimony of one hundred people.

וּמוֹדִים חֲכָמִים לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה בַּחֲלָבִין וּבְבִיאַת מִקְדָּשׁ, אֲבָל בְּטוּמְאָה – לָא מוֹדוּ לֵיהּ.

The baraita continues: And the Rabbis, whose opinion is cited in the mishna, concede to Rabbi Yehuda with regard to denying the accusation of two witnesses that he ate forbidden fats, or with regard to entering the Temple in a state of impurity, that if the person says that he did not eat the fats or enter the Temple, he is deemed credible. But with regard to ritual impurity, where witnesses say that he entered the Temple or ate sanctified food while impure and he says that he entered the Temple or ate the sanctified food but he was not impure, they do not concede to him; rather, they accept the opinion of Rabbi Meir that the testimony of two witnesses renders him obligated to bring an offering despite the fact that he denies that he transgressed.

בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן? אִילֵּימָא

The Gemara asks: What type of impurity are we dealing with? If we say

בְּטוּמְאָה יְשָׁנָה, מַאי שְׁנָא חֲלָבִין וּבִיאַת מִקְדָּשׁ דְּמוֹדוּ לֵיהּ, דְּאִם רָצָה יֹאמַר: ״מֵזִיד הָיִיתִי״? טוּמְאָה יְשָׁנָה נָמֵי מְתָרֵץ דִּיבּוּרֵיהּ, דְּאִם רָצָה יֹאמַר: ״לֹא עָמַדְתִּי בְּטוּמְאָתִי אֶלָּא טָבַלְתִּי״!

that the baraita is referring to a case of old impurity, where the witnesses said to him: You became impure yesterday, what is different about the cases of eating forbidden fat and entering the Temple while impure, where the Rabbis concede to Rabbi Yehuda that one is not liable to bring a sin offering even though his denial is contradicted by two witnesses? He is exempt since if he wished, he could say: I did so intentionally. Therefore, his denial can be interpreted to mean: My eating the forbidden fat or entering the Temple was not unwitting but intentional. If so, if he denies that he is in a state of old impurity, he can also explain his statement, since if he wished, he could say that he meant: I did not remain in my state of ritual impurity, but rather I immersed in a ritual bath.

אָמַר רָבִינָא: לְעוֹלָם בְּטוּמְאָה יְשָׁנָה, וּכְגוֹן דְּאָמְרִי לֵיהּ עֵדִים: אָכַלְתָּ קָדָשִׁים בְּטוּמְאַת הַגּוּף, וְהוּא אָמַר לְהוֹן: ״לֹא נִטְמֵאתִי״, דְּהָכָא לָא מְתָרֵיץ דִּיבּוּרֵיהּ. דְּלֵיכָּא לְמֵימַר לֹא עָמַדְתִּי בְּטוּמְאָה אֲבָל טָבַלְתִּי,

Ravina said: Actually, the baraita can be referring to a case of old impurity, and nevertheless the Rabbis distinguish between one’s denial that he is impure and one’s denial that he ate or entered the Temple. The case is one where the witnesses say to him: You ate sacrificial meat while in a state of physical impurity, and he says to them: I did not become impure. The reason he is liable to bring an offering is that here he cannot explain his statement, as one cannot say that the phrase: I did not become impure, can be explained to mean: I did not remain in a state of impurity but rather I immersed.

מַאי אָמַר לְהוֹן? ״טָבַלְתִּי וְאָכַלְתִּי״, כִּי אָמַר לְהוֹן הָכִי, אִיתַּכְחַשׁ לֵיהּ דִּבּוּרֵיהּ קַמָּא מִיהָא בְּטוּמְאַת מַגָּעוֹ!

Ravina elaborates: What would he say to them to explain his statement that he did not become impure? If he says: I immersed and I ate, then when he says this to them, his initial statement has been contradicted in any event with regard to his impurity imparted by contact. His initial claim that he did not become impure has not been adjusted with regard to this matter, and that claim was contradicted by the two witnesses.

אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה. אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: לֹא אֲמָרָהּ [רַבִּי יְהוּדָה] אֶלָּא בֵּינוֹ לְבֵין עַצְמוֹ וּלְעַצְמוֹ.

Rav Naḥman says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda that even if two witnesses testify that a person became impure, and he claims that he did not become impure, he is deemed credible about himself more than the testimony of one hundred people. Rav Yosef says: Rabbi Yehuda said that he is deemed credible when he states that he is pure against the testimony of witnesses only when the person is by himself and only with regard to himself, but as far as others are concerned, he is regarded as impure.

אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: מוֹדֶה רַבִּי מֵאִיר לַחֲכָמִים, שֶׁאִם אָמְרוּ לוֹ שְׁנַיִם: בָּעַלְתָּ שִׁפְחָה חֲרוּפָה, וְהוּא אוֹמֵר: לֹא בָּעַלְתִּי – מְהֵימַן, דְּאִי בָּעֵי אָמַר לְהוֹן: לֹא גָּמַרְתִּי בִּיאָתִי.

Reish Lakish says: Although according to Rabbi Meir one is liable to bring an offering based on the testimony of two witnesses that he ate forbidden fat even if he denied it, Rabbi Meir concedes to the Rabbis that if two witnesses said to him: You engaged in sexual intercourse with an espoused maidservant, and he says: I did not engage in sexual intercourse, he is deemed credible, since if he wishes, he can say to them: I did not complete my act of intercourse, in which case, as stated earlier (10b), he is not liable to bring a guilt offering.

אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: מוֹדֶה רַבִּי מֵאִיר לַחֲכָמִים בְּנָזִיר טָמֵא, שֶׁאָמְרוּ לוֹ שְׁנַיִם: נִטְמֵאתָ, וְהוּא אוֹמֵר: לֹא נִטְמֵאתִי – פָּטוּר, דְּאִי בָּעֵי אָמַר: נִשְׁאַלְתִּי עַל נִזְירִי.

Likewise, Rav Sheshet says: Rabbi Meir concedes to the Rabbis in the case of an impure nazirite, i.e., one to whom two witnesses said: You became impure and are therefore liable to bring a sin offering, and he says: I did not become impure, that he is exempt, since if he wishes, he can say: I requested from a halakhic authority to dissolve my nazirite vow, and he dissolved it. Therefore, it was permitted for me to become impure. Nazirites are prohibited from becoming impure with the impurity imparted by a corpse, whereas non-nazirites may come into contact with a corpse.

אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: מוֹדֶה רַבִּי מֵאִיר לַחֲכָמִים, שֶׁאִם אָמְרוּ לוֹ שְׁנַיִם: יוֹדֵעַ אַתָּה בְּעֵדוּת פְּלוֹנִי, וְהוּא אוֹמֵר: לֹא יָדַעְתִּי – פָּטוּר, דְּאִי בָּעֵי אָמַר: לֹא נִתְכַּוַּונְתִּי לְעֵדוּת.

Likewise, Abaye says: Rabbi Meir concedes to the Rabbis that if two witnesses said to a person: You know testimony about so-and-so, and he says: I do not know, and he takes an oath to this effect, he is exempt from bringing an offering for taking a false oath of testimony. The reason is that if he wishes, he can say: I did witness the event, but I had not intended to offer testimony, in which case he is exempt from bringing an offering for taking a false oath of testimony.

אָכַל חֵלֶב וָחֵלֶב בְּהֶעְלֵם (אַחַת) [אֶחָד]. מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַבִּי זֵירָא: אַמַּאי אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא חַטָּאת אַחַת וְהָא שְׁנֵי זֵיתֵי חֵלֶב אָכַל!

§ The mishna teaches that if one unwittingly ate an olive-bulk of forbidden fat and then ate another olive-bulk of forbidden fat during one lapse of awareness, he is liable to bring only one sin offering. Rabbi Zeira objects to this: Why is he liable to bring only one sin offering? But didn’t he eat two olive-bulks of forbidden fat?

אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: הֶעְלֵמוֹת מְחוּלָּקוֹת, וְהָכָא הֶעְלֵם אֶחָד הוּא דְּאִיכָּא.

Abaye said to Rabbi Zeira: One is liable to bring two sin offerings only when he ate the olive-bulks of forbidden fat during separate lapses of awareness, e.g., he ate forbidden fat when he was unaware that it was prohibited, and subsequently became aware of the prohibition and then forgot about it and ate another olive-bulk of forbidden fat. This is derived from the verse: “If his sin, which he has sinned, is known to him, then he shall bring for his offering a goat, a female without blemish, for his sin which he has sinned” (Leviticus 4:28). But here there is only one lapse of awareness.

אִיכָּא דְּמַקְשֵׁי לֵיהּ הָכִי: טַעְמָא דְּהֶעְלֵם אֶחָד, הָא בִּשְׁתֵּי הֶעְלֵמוֹת חַיָּיב שְׁתַּיִם. אַמַּאי? שֵׁם חֵלֶב אֶחָד הוּא! אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: הֶעְלֵמוֹת מְחוּלָּקִין.

The Gemara cites a different version of the discussion between Rabbi Zeira and Abaye. There are those who claim that Rabbi Zeira raised his difficulty to Abaye in this manner: The reason that one is liable to bring only one sin offering for his two transgressions of eating forbidden fat is that both acts took place during one lapse of awareness; but if he ate forbidden fat in two lapses of awareness, he is liable to bring two sin offerings. But why? It is one category of prohibition of forbidden fat that he has violated, and therefore he should bring only one sin offering. Abaye said to Rabbi Zeira: With regard to bringing sin offerings, separate lapses of awareness render him liable to bring multiple offerings.

אָכַל חֵלֶב וָדָם פִּיגּוּל וְנוֹתָר – חַיָּיב כּוּ׳.

§ The mishna teaches: If one ate forbidden fat, and blood, and piggul, and notar in one lapse of awareness, he is liable to bring a sin offering for each and every one of them. In a case where one ate half an olive-bulk and then ate another half olive-bulk during one lapse of awareness, if the two half olive-bulks were both from one type of forbidden food, he is liable to bring a sin offering. If they were from two types, he is exempt.

מִמִּין אֶחָד חַיָּיב, פְּשִׁיטָא! אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ מִשּׁוּם בַּר תּוּטֵינִי: כְּגוֹן שֶׁאֲכָלוֹ בִּשְׁנֵי תַמְחוּיִין, וְאַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ: דְּאָמַר תַּמְחוּיִין מְחוּלָּקִין.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: The ruling that if one ate two halves of an olive-bulk of one type of food he is liable to bring a sin offering is obvious, as he ate an olive-bulk of a forbidden food. Reish Lakish said in the name of bar Tutini: This is referring to a case where he ate them from two dishes, and it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, who says that eating food from distinct dishes differentiates his acts of consumption and renders them separate transgressions.

מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: כִּי אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ – לָא שְׁנָא לְקוּלָּא, וְלָא שְׁנָא לְחוּמְרָא. קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן דְּחַיָּיב, אַלְמָא: לְחוּמְרָא אָמַר, לְקוּלָּא לָא אָמַר.

This ruling was necessary lest you say that when Rabbi Yehoshua says that separate dishes render his acts separate transgressions, it is no different if this principle results in a leniency and it is no different if it results in a stringency. Therefore, the mishna teaches us that if he ate two half olive-bulks from two dishes, he is liable to bring a sin offering. Evidently, Rabbi Yehoshua says that eating food from separate dishes renders his acts of consumption separate transgressions only when this principle produces a stringency, but he did not say it as a leniency.

אִיכָּא דְּאָמַר עַל סֵיפָא: מִשְּׁנֵי מִינִין – פָּטוּר. פְּשִׁיטָא! אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ מִשּׁוּם בַּר תּוּטֵינִי: כְּגוֹן שֶׁאֲכָלוֹ בִּשְׁנֵי תַמְחוּיִין, וְאַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ: דְּאָמַר תַּמְחוּיִין מְחוּלָּקִין.

There are those who say that this discussion referred to the latter clause of the mishna: In a case where one ate half an olive-bulk and then ate another half olive-bulk during one lapse of awareness, if they were from two types of food, he is exempt. The Gemara asks: Isn’t that obvious, as he did not eat an entire olive-bulk of one type? Reish Lakish said in the name of bar Tutini: The mishna is referring to a case where he ate an olive-bulk of one type, but he ate it in two dishes, and it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, who says that eating food from separate dishes differentiates his acts of consumption and renders them separate transgressions.

דְּמַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: כִּי אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ – לְחוּמְרָא אָמַר, לְקוּלָּא לָא אָמַר. קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן: מִשְּׁנֵי מִינִין פָּטוּר.

This ruling was necessary lest you say that when Rabbi Yehoshua says that separate dishes render his acts separate transgressions, he says it only when it results in a stringency, but he does not say it when it results in a leniency. Therefore, the mishna teaches us that if he ate an olive-bulk from two types of food, he is exempt.

מַאי מִשְּׁנֵי מִינִין? מִמִּין אֶחָד הוּא, וְאַמַּאי קָרֵי לֵיהּ שְׁנֵי מִינִים – מִשּׁוּם דַּאֲכָלוֹ בִּשְׁנֵי תַמְחוּיִין, וְקָתָנֵי: פָּטוּר, אַלְמָא לָא שְׁנָא לְקוּלָּא וְלָא שְׁנָא לְחוּמְרָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ.

The Gemara explains: What does the mishna mean when it states the case of eating from two types of food? It is actually a case of two half olive-bulks from one type of food; and why does the tanna call it two types? It is because he ate it in two dishes, half an olive-bulk in each dish, and the mishna teaches that he is exempt. Evidently, it is no different if it results in a leniency and it is no different if it results in a stringency; in both cases Rabbi Yehoshua says that separate dishes render one’s acts of consumption separate transgressions.

מִדְּסֵיפָא מִין אֶחָד וּשְׁנֵי תַמְחוּיִין, רֵישָׁא מִין אֶחָד וְתַמְחוּי אֶחָד. פְּשִׁיטָא!

The Gemara objects: From the fact that in the latter clause, when the mishna refers to two types of food it actually means one type of food but the case is where one ate it from two dishes, one can infer that when the former clause states that if one ate two half olive-bulks of one type of food he is liable to bring a sin offering, it must mean that it is one type of food and one ate it from one dish. But if so, why is it necessary to state this halakha; isn’t it obvious?

אָמַר רָבִינָא: כְּגוֹן שֶׁהָיְתָה לוֹ יְדִיעָה בֵּינְתַיִים, וְאַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, דְּאָמַר: אֵין יְדִיעָה לַחֲצִי שִׁיעוּר.

Ravina said: The mishna is referring to a case where he ate the two half olive-bulks but he had a period of awareness in the interim, e.g., he unwittingly ate half an olive-bulk of forbidden fat, then he became aware that he had done so, and subsequently he unwittingly ate another half an olive-bulk of forbidden fat. And the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Gamliel, who says: There is no awareness for a half-measure. If one unwittingly performed a half-measure of a prohibited act and then became aware of his transgression, and then again unwittingly performed another half-measure of the prohibited act, his awareness in the interim does not prevent the two acts from combining. Accordingly, in the case here, it is as though he ate a full olive-bulk during one lapse of awareness.

דִּתְנַן: הַכּוֹתֵב שְׁתֵּי אוֹתִיּוֹת בִּשְׁתֵּי הֶעְלֵמוֹת, אַחַת שַׁחֲרִית וְאַחַת עַרְבִית – רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל מִחַיַּיב, וַחֲכָמִים פּוֹטְרִין.

As we learned in a mishna (Shabbat 105a): With regard to one who writes two letters on Shabbat, which is the minimum that one must write in order to be rendered liable for this prohibited labor, and he did so unwittingly in two separate lapses of awareness, one letter in the morning and one letter in the afternoon, Rabban Gamliel deems him liable to bring a sin offering for writing on Shabbat, and the Rabbis deem him exempt.

רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל סָבַר: אֵין יְדִיעָה לַחֲצִי שִׁיעוּר, וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: יֵשׁ יְדִיעָה לַחֲצִי שִׁיעוּר.

The basis of this dispute is that Rabban Gamliel holds that there is no awareness for a half-measure. Therefore, the fact that he became aware of his transgression after writing the first letter is of no significance. His awareness does not divide between the first act of writing a letter and the second act of writing a letter. And the Rabbis hold: There is awareness for a half-measure. Consequently, the two half-measures are considered to have been performed during separate lapses of awareness, and they do not combine to render him liable to bring a sin offering.

מַתְנִי׳ כַּמָּה יִשְׁהֶא בָּאוֹכָלִין? כְּאִילּוּ אוֹכֵל קְלָיוֹת, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: עַד שֶׁיִּשְׁהֶא מִתְּחִלָּה וְעַד סוֹף כְּדֵי אֲכִילַת פְּרָס – חַיָּיב.

MISHNA: How much time can one expend while eating an olive-bulk of forbidden food and still be liable for violating the prohibition? The duration is calculated as though he were eating toasted grain, which one eats one kernel at a time. If he eats the olive-bulk of forbidden food within the amount of time it would take to eat an olive-bulk of toasted grain, he is liable. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: Unless the amount of time he expends from beginning to end is more than the time it takes to eat a half-loaf [peras] of bread, he is liable.

אָכַל אוֹכָלִין טְמֵאִין וְשָׁתָה מַשְׁקִין טְמֵאִין, שָׁתָה רְבִיעִית יַיִן וְנִכְנַס לַמִּקְדָּשׁ וְשָׁהָה כְּדֵי אֲכִילַת פְּרָס – חַיָּיב, רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אוֹמֵר: אִם פָּסֵק בָּהּ אוֹ אִם נָתַן בּוֹ מַיִם כׇּל שֶׁהוּא – פָּטוּר.

Likewise, one who ate a quarter-loaf of ritually impure foods or drank a quarter-log of ritually impure liquids within the amount of time it takes to eat a half-loaf of bread is rendered unfit to partake of teruma, the portion of the produce designated for priests, until he becomes pure. Similarly, if one drank a quarter–log of wine and entered the Temple, and he remained there for the time it takes to eat a half-loaf of bread, he is liable. Rabbi Elazar says: If he interrupted his drinking of the quarter-log of wine or if he placed any amount of water into the wine, he is exempt.

גְּמָ׳ אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: רַבִּי מֵאִיר, לְחוּמְרָא קָאָמַר אוֹ לְקוּלָּא קָאָמַר? לְחוּמְרָא קָאָמַר, וְהָכִי קָתָנֵי: כְּאִילּוּ אוֹכֵל קְלָיוֹת, דַּאֲפִילּוּ כּוּלֵּיהּ יוֹמָא. וְאַף עַל גַּב דְּמִתְּחִלָּה וְעַד סוֹף יוֹתֵר מִכְּדֵי אֲכִילַת פְּרָס, כֵּיוָן דִּמְשִׁיכָה אֲכִילְתֵיהּ – מִחַיַּיב. וַאֲמַרוּ לֵיהּ רַבָּנַן: דְּעַד שֶׁיִּשְׁהֶא בִּכְדֵי אֲכִילַת פְּרָס הוּא דְּחַיָּיב יוֹתֵר מִכְּדֵי אֲכִילַת פְּרָס – פָּטוּר.

GEMARA: A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Does Rabbi Meir state his opinion, that the duration of time is calculated as though one were eating toasted grain, as a stringency or does he state it as a leniency? The Gemara elaborates: Does he state it as a stringency, and this is what he is teaching: The duration is calculated as though he were eating toasted grain a little at a time, and therefore even if it takes him the entire day to consume an olive-bulk of the forbiden food, and even though from beginning to end he expends more than the time it takes to eat a half-loaf of bread, since he consumed a full olive-bulk in one extended act of eating, he is liable; and the Rabbis said to him that unless he expends less than the time it takes to eat a half-loaf of bread, he is liable, but if he expends more than the time it takes to eat a half-loaf of bread, he is exempt?

אוֹ דִלְמָא לְקוּלָּא קָאָמַר, דְּהָכִי קָתָנֵי: כְּאִילּוּ אוֹכֵל קְלָיוֹת, וְהוּא דְּלָא אַיפְסֵיק בֵּינֵי וּבֵינֵי, אֲבָל דְּאַיפְסֵיק בֵּינֵי וּבֵינֵי, אַף עַל גַּב דְּמִתְּחִלָּה וְעַד סוֹף בִּכְדֵי אֲכִילַת פְּרָס – פָּטוּר. וְאָמְרוּ לֵיהּ רַבָּנַן: כֵּיוָן דְּמִתְּחִלָּה וְעַד סוֹף בִּכְדֵי אֲכִילַת פְּרָס הוּא – חַיָּיב?

Or perhaps Rabbi Meir says his opinion as a leniency, as this is what he is teaching: The duration is calculated as though he were eating toasted grain, which is eaten continuously one kernel after another, and therefore he is liable only if he did not interrupt at all in between his bites. But if he interrupted in between them, then although the duration from beginning to end was less than the time it takes to eat a half-loaf of bread, he is exempt; and the Rabbis said to him: Since the amount of time from beginning to end is less than the time it takes to eat a half-loaf of bread, he is liable, despite the interruptions.

תָּא שְׁמַע: וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: עֵד שֶׁיִּשְׁהֶא בִּכְדֵי אֲכִילַת פְּרָס מִתְּחִלָּה וְעַד סוֹף.

The Gemara suggests a resolution: Come and hear the mishna: And the Rabbis say: Unless the amount of time he expends from beginning to end is the time it takes to eat a half-loaf of bread.