כריתות כה

כריתות כה

אָמַר רַבִּי יַנַּאי: גְּבוּל שָׁמַעְתִּי בָּהּ וְשָׁכַחְתִּי, וְנָסְבִין חַבְרַיָּיא לְמֵימַר: יְרִידָתָהּ לְנַחַל אֵיתָן אוֹסַרְתָּהּ.

Rabbi Yannai says: I heard an answer with regard to the boundary, i.e., the stage, beyond which it is prohibited, but I have forgotten what it is; and the members of the group of Sages were inclined to say that its descent to the rough, dried-up stream, where its neck is broken, is the action that renders it prohibited.

אָמַר רַב הַמְנוּנָא: מְנָא אָמֵינָא לַהּ? דִּתְנַן: הַשּׁוֹחֵט פָּרַת חַטָּאת, וְשׁוֹר הַנִּסְקָל, וְעֶגְלָה עֲרוּפָה – רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן פּוֹטֵר, וַחֲכָמִים מְחַיְּיבִין.

Rav Hamnuna said: From where do I say that the prohibition takes effect when the animal is alive? I say it from that which we learned in a mishna (Ḥullin 81b): With regard to one who slaughters the red heifer of purification, or an ox that was sentenced to be stoned, or a heifer whose neck is broken, all of which are animals from which deriving benefit is prohibited, Rabbi Shimon exempts one who slaughters them from receiving lashes for violating the prohibition of the slaughter of a mother and its offspring, if the mother was slaughtered on that same day; and the Rabbis deem him liable.

בִּשְׁלָמָא לְדִידִי, דְּאָמֵינָא מֵחַיִּים, בְּהָא פְּלִיגִי רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן וְרַבָּנַן, דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן סָבַר: שְׁחִיטָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ רְאוּיָה – לֹא שְׁמָהּ שְׁחִיטָה.

Rav Hamnuna explains his proof: Granted, according to my opinion, that I say the prohibition takes effect from the time when the animal is alive, Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis disagree with regard to this matter, as Rabbi Shimon holds: Slaughter that does not render the animal fit for consumption is not considered slaughter. The slaughter of the heifer does not render it fit for consumption, as it was already prohibited to derive benefit from the animal while it is alive. Therefore, he does not violate the prohibition against slaughtering a mother and its offspring.

וְרַבָּנַן אָמְרִי: שְׁחִיטָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ רְאוּיָה – שְׁמָהּ שְׁחִיטָה. אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ לְאַחַר עֲרִיפָה, אַמַּאי פָּטַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן? שְׁחִיטָה רְאוּיָה הִיא!

Rav Hamnuna continues: And the Rabbis say: Slaughter that does not render the animal fit for consumption is considered slaughter, and therefore he is liable for the slaughter of a mother and its offspring. But if you say that the prohibition does not take effect until after the breaking of the neck of the heifer, why does Rabbi Shimon exempt him; it is a slaughter that renders the animal fit for consumption?

וְכִי תֵּימָא: סָבַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן עֶגְלָה בִּשְׁחִיטָה כְּשֵׁרָה, וְהָתְנַן: כָּשֵׁר בַּפָּרָה פָּסוּל – בְּעֶגְלָה עֲרוּפָה, פָּסוּל בַּפָּרָה – כָּשֵׁר בְּעֶגְלָה עֲרוּפָה. פָּרָה, בִּשְׁחִיטָה – כְּשֵׁרָה, בַּעֲרִיפָה – פְּסוּלָה, עֶגְלָה, בַּעֲרִיפָה – כְּשֵׁרָה, בִּשְׁחִיטָה – פְּסוּלָה!

And if you would say the reason is that Rabbi Shimon holds that one who performs the breaking of the neck of the heifer by slaughter has performed the mitzva in a fit manner, and consequently that slaughter rendered the heifer prohibited with regard to deriving benefit from it and it is therefore unfit for consumption, that suggestion cannot be correct. Didn’t we learn in a mishna (Ḥullin 23b): That which is fit in a red heifer is unfit in a heifer whose neck is broken; that which is fit in a heifer whose neck is broken is unfit in a red heifer. How so? With regard to the red heifer, it is fit with slaughter; it is unfit with breaking the neck. With regard to the heifer whose neck is to be broken, it is fit with breaking the neck; it is unfit with slaughter.

אִישְׁתִּיק. לְבָתַר דִּנְפַק, אֲמַר: מַאי טַעְמָא לָא אָמֵינָא לֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן סָבַר: עֶגְלָה בִּשְׁחִיטָה כְּשֵׁירָה!

Rava, who holds that the prohibition takes effect only from when the heifer’s neck is broken, was silent, as he had no immediate answer. After Rav Hamnuna left the study hall, Rava said: What is the reason I did not say to him that Rabbi Shimon disagrees with the ruling of that mishna and holds that a heifer whose neck is to be broken is fit even if it is killed by slaughtering?

וְרַב הַמְנוּנָא אָמַר לָךְ: לָא נִשְׁתְּמִיט תַּנָּא דְּנַשְׁמְעִינַן עֶגְלָה בִּשְׁחִיטָה כְּשֵׁרָה, דְּתֵימָא רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן הִיא.

The Gemara notes: But if Rava had given that answer, Rav Hamnuna could have said to you in response to that claim: The mishna would not have left out the opinion of the tanna who teaches us that a heifer whose neck is to be broken is fit if it is killed by slaughtering. In other words, there should be some source for this opinion, and in the absence of a source, there is no basis for saying that this is the opinion of Rabbi Shimon.

אָמַר רָבָא: מְנָא אָמֵינָא לַהּ? מִדִּתְנַן: עֶגְלָה עֲרוּפָה אֵינָהּ כֵּן, עַד שֶׁלֹּא נֶעֶרְפָה – תֵּצֵא וְתִרְעֶה בָּעֵדֶר. וְאִי אָמְרַתְּ מֵחַיִּים, אַמַּאי תֵּצֵא וְתִרְעֶה בָּעֵדֶר? הָא אִיתַּסְרָא לַהּ מֵחַיִּים!

Rava said: From where do I say that the prohibition takes effect when the animal’s neck is broken? I say it from that which we learned in the mishna: In the case of a heifer whose neck is broken, that is not so; if the identity of the murderer is discovered before the heifer’s neck was broken, it shall go out and graze among the flock, as it is not consecrated, like all other animals. And if you say that the prohibition takes effect from the time when the animal is alive, why does it go out and graze among the flock? Wasn’t the animal prohibited already from when it was alive?

תְּנִי: עַד שֶׁלֹּא נִרְאֵית לַעֲרִיפָה. אֵימָא סֵיפָא: מִשֶּׁנֶּעֶרְפָה – תִּקָּבֵר בִּמְקוֹמָהּ! תְּנִי: מִשֶּׁנִּרְאֵית לַעֲרִיפָה.

The Gemara rejects this proof: One should teach the mishna as follows: If the identity of the murderer is discovered before the heifer was fit for having its neck broken, i.e., before it descended to a rough, dried-up stream, it shall go out and graze among the flock, but after that time it is prohibited to derive benefit from the animal. Rava raises a further difficulty: Say the latter clause of the mishna: But if the identity of the murderer was discovered after the heifer’s neck was broken, it shall be buried in its place. This indicates that the prohibition takes effect only after the heifer’s neck is broken. The Gemara rejects this proof in a similar manner: Teach that the mishna says: If the identity of the murderer was discovered after the heifer was fit for having its neck broken it shall be buried.

אִם כֵּן, אֵימָא סֵיפָא: שֶׁעַל הַסָּפֵק בָּאָה מִתְּחִלָּה, כִּיפְּרָה סְפֵיקָהּ וְהָלְכָה לָהּ. וְאִי מֵחַיִּים, עֲדַיִין לֹא כִּיפְּרָה סְפֵיקָהּ!

Rava continues to ask: If so, say the latter clause of the mishna: The reason for this halakha is that from the outset, the heifer whose neck is broken comes to atone for a situation of uncertainty. If its neck was broken before the identity of the murderer was revealed, its mitzva was fulfilled, as it atoned for its uncertainty and that uncertainty is gone. And if the mishna is discussing a case where the animal is alive, the heifer has still not atoned for its uncertainty. Rather, it is clear from the last clause of the mishna that the prohibition takes effect when the heifer’s neck is broken.

תַּנָּאֵי הִיא, דְּתַנְיָא: נֶאֱמַר מַכְשִׁיר וּמְכַפֵּר בִּפְנִים, וְנֶאֱמַר מַכְשִׁיר וּמְכַפֵּר בַּחוּץ.

The Gemara explains: Although it is evident that the mishna rules that the prohibition takes effect when the heifer’s neck is broken, this matter is a dispute between tanna’im, as it is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rav Hamnuna: It is stated in the Torah that there are offerings that enable one to partake of sacrificial foods, e.g., the guilt offering of a leper, and there are offerings that atone, e.g., a sin offering or guilt offering, all of which are brought inside the Temple. And it is also stated in the Torah that there are offerings that enable one to partake of sacrificial foods, e.g., the birds of a leper’s purification ritual, and offerings that atone, e.g., the heifer whose neck is broken, that are brought outside the Temple.

מָה מַכְשִׁיר וּמְכַפֵּר הָאָמוּר בִּפְנִים, עָשָׂה בּוֹ מַכְשִׁיר כִּמְכַפֵּר – אַף מַכְשִׁיר [וּמְכַפֵּר] הָאָמוּר בַּחוּץ, עָשָׂה מַכְשִׁיר כִּמְכַפֵּר.

The baraita continues: Therefore, the offerings brought outside the Temple are compared to those offered inside: Just as with regard to the offerings that enable or atone which are stated in the Torah that are sacrificed inside the Temple, the Torah made the offering that enables like the offering that atones, as even the former has portions of it that are burned on the altar, so too, with regard to offerings that enable or atone which are stated in the Torah that are sacrificed outside the Temple, the Torah made the offering that enables, e.g., the birds of a leper, like the offering that atones, e.g., the heifer whose neck is broken, in that one is prohibited from deriving benefit from either while they are still alive. According to this baraita, the heifer whose neck is broken is prohibited while it is still alive.

מַתְנִי׳ רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: מִתְנַדֵּב אָדָם אָשָׁם תָּלוּי בְּכׇל יוֹם וּבְכׇל עֵת שֶׁיִּרְצֶה. הוּא הָיָה נִקְרָא אֲשַׁם חֲסִידִים. אָמְרוּ עָלָיו עַל בָּבָא בֶּן בּוּטָא שֶׁהָיָה מִתְנַדֵּב אָשָׁם תָּלוּי בְּכׇל יוֹם, חוּץ מֵאַחַר יוֹם כִּיפּוּרִים יוֹם אֶחָד.

MISHNA: Rabbi Eliezer says: A person may volunteer to bring a provisional guilt offering every day and at any time that he chooses, even if there is no uncertainty as to whether he sinned, and this type of offering was called the guilt offering of the pious, as they brought it due to their constant concern that they might have sinned. They said about Bava ben Buta that he would volunteer to bring a provisional guilt offering every day except for one day after Yom Kippur, when he would not bring the offering.

אָמַר: הַמָּעוֹן הַזֶּה! אִילּוּ הָיוּ מַנִּיחִין לִי הָיִיתִי מֵבִיא, אֶלָּא אוֹמְרִים לִי: הַמְתֵּין עַד שֶׁתִּכָּנֵס לְסָפֵק. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אֵין מֵבִיא אָשָׁם תָּלוּי אֶלָּא עַל שֶׁזְּדוֹנוֹ כָּרֵת וְשִׁגְגָתוֹ חַטָּאת.

Bava ben Buta said: I take an oath by this abode of the Divine Presence that if they would have allowed me, I would have brought a guilt offering even on that day. But they would say to me: Wait until you enter into a situation of potential uncertainty. And the Rabbis say: One brings a provisional guilt offering only in a case where there is uncertainty as to whether he performed a sin for whose intentional performance one is liable to receive karet and for whose unwitting performance one is liable to bring a sin offering.

חַיָּיבֵי חַטָּאוֹת וַאֲשָׁמוֹת וַדָּאִין שֶׁעָבַר עֲלֵיהֶן יוֹם הַכִּיפּוּרִים – חַיָּיבִין לְהָבִיא לְאַחַר יוֹם הַכִּיפּוּרִים, וְחַיָּיבֵי אֲשָׁמוֹת תְּלוּיִין – פְּטוּרִין. מִי שֶׁבָּא בְּיָדוֹ סְפֵק עֲבֵירָה בְּיוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים, אֲפִילּוּ עִם חֲשֵׁיכָה – פָּטוּר, שֶׁכׇּל הַיּוֹם מְכַפֵּר.

Those liable to bring sin offerings and definite guilt offerings for whom Yom Kippur has passed are liable to bring them after Yom Kippur.By contrast, those liable to bring provisional guilt offerings are exempt from bringing them after Yom Kippur. With regard to one who encountered uncertainty as to whether he performed a sin on Yom Kippur, even if it was at nightfall at the end of the day, he is exempt, as the entire day atones for uncertain sins.

הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁיֵּשׁ עָלֶיהָ חַטַּאת הָעוֹף סָפֵק, וְעָבַר עָלֶיהָ יוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים – חַיֶּיבֶת לְהָבִיא לְאַחַר יוֹם הַכִּיפּוּרִים, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהִיא מַכְשֶׁרֶת לֶאֱכוֹל בִּזְבָחִים. חַטַּאת הָעוֹף הַבָּאָה עַל הַסָּפֵק, אִם מִשֶּׁנִּמְלְקָה נוֹדַע – תִּקָּבֵר.

A woman upon whom it is incumbent to bring a bird sin offering due to uncertainty, e.g., uncertainty with regard to whether or not her miscarriage obligated her to bring the sin offering of a woman who gave birth, for whom Yom Kippur has passed, is liable to bring it after Yom Kippur. This is because the offering does not come as atonement for a sin; rather, it renders her eligible to partake of the meat of offerings. With regard to this bird sin offering that is brought due to uncertainty, if it became known to her that she was exempt from bringing the offering after the nape of the neck of the bird was pinched, the bird must be buried.

גְּמָ׳ מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר? אִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ חוֹבָה הִיא, [כִּי] מִתְיְידַע לֵיהּ, אַמַּאי מַיְיתֵי חַטָּאת? אֶלָּא שְׁמַע מִינָּה: נְדָבָה הִיא.

GEMARA: What is the reason that Rabbi Eliezer holds that one may volunteer to bring a provisional guilt offering every day and at any time that he chooses? If it enters your mind that a provisional guilt offering is obligatory, then why does he bring a sin offering when it becomes known to him that he sinned? In that case, he has already fulfilled his obligation by sacrificing a provisional guilt offering. Rather, conclude from this inference that a provisional guilt offering is a gift offering.

וְרַבָּנַן: עוֹלָה וּשְׁלָמִים הוּא דְּאָתוּ בְּנֶדֶר וּנְדָבָה, אֲבָל חַטָּאת וְאָשָׁם – חוֹבָה נִינְהוּ. וְאָשָׁם תָּלוּי, הַיְינוּ טַעְמָא דְּמַיְיתֵי מִקַּמֵּי דְּמִתְיְידַע לֵיהּ – לְהָגֵן עָלָיו, דְּהַתּוֹרָה חָסָה עַל גּוּפָן שֶׁל יִשְׂרָאֵל.

And the Rabbis would respond: It is a burnt offering and a peace offering that come as a vow and gift offering, but a sin offering and a guilt offering, including a provisional guilt offering, are obligatory. And as for a provisional guilt offering, this is the reason that he brings it before his sin is known to him: It is not to achieve atonement, but to protect him from suffering until his sin is known to him, as the Torah spared the bodies of the Jewish people by commanding them to bring this offering.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרָבָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: דִּילְמָא אָשָׁם תָּלוּי כְּעוֹלָה וּשְׁלָמִים, מָה עוֹלָה וּשְׁלָמִים דְּאָתוּ בְּחוֹבָה וְאָתוּ בִּנְדָבָה, אָשָׁם תָּלוּי נָמֵי, דְּאָתֵי בְּחוֹבָה, אָתֵי נָמֵי בִּנְדָבָה!

Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: According to the opinion of the Rabbis, one can suggest that perhaps a provisional guilt offering is like a burnt offering and a peace offering: Just as a burnt offering and a peace offering sometimes come as obligatory offerings, e.g., the Festival peace offering and the burnt offering of appearance brought on the pilgrimage Festivals, and they sometimes come as gift offerings, likewise, a provisional guilt offering also sometimes comes as an obligatory offering and sometimes comes as a gift offering as well.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: עוֹלָה וּשְׁלָמִים עִיקָּר בִּנְדָבָה כְּתִיבִי, אָשָׁם תָּלוּי עִיקָּר בְּחוֹבָה כְּתִיב.

Rav Ashi said to Rav Aḥa, son of Rava: A burnt offering and a peace offering are primarily written, i.e., discussed, in the context of a gift offering, and they are brought as obligatory offerings only in specific cases mentioned explicitly in the Torah. By contrast, a provisional guilt offering is primarily written in the context of an obligatory offering, similar to a sin offering and a guilt offering.

תָּנֵי רַבִּי חִיָּיא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרָבָא:

Rabbi Ḥiyya teaches before Rava:

אָשָׁם תָּלוּי בָּא עַל הַנְּבֵלָה. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: וְהָאֲנַן תְּנַן, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אֵינוֹ מֵבִיא אָשָׁם תָּלוּי אֶלָּא עַל דָּבָר שֶׁזְּדוֹנוֹ כָּרֵת וְשִׁגְגָתוֹ חַטָּאת! וְאִי רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, בִּנְדָבָה נָמֵי אָתֵי!

A provisional guilt offering comes for the uncertain consumption of a non-kosher animal carcass. Rava said to him: But didn’t we learn in the mishna: And the Rabbis say that one brings a provisional guilt offering only for uncertain performance of a matter for whose intentional performance one is liable to receive karet and for whose unwitting performance one is liable to bring a sin offering? But here the consumption of an animal carcass is a violation of a prohibition that does not entail karet or a sin offering. And if you are referring to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, he maintains that a provisional guilt offering comes also as a gift offering, without any uncertain sin.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מַאי טַעְמָא לָא מַתְנֵית? זִימְנִין סַגִּיאִין תְּנֵיתַהּ קַמֵּי מָר, וּמַנּוּ – רַבָּה, וְאָמַר לִי: הָא מַנִּי? רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר הִיא דְּאָמְרוּ לוֹ, דִּתְנַן: אֶלָּא אוֹמְרִים לוֹ הַמְתֵּן עַד שֶׁתִּכָּנֵס לְבֵית הַסָּפֵק.

Rabbi Ḥiyya said to Rava: What is the reason that you did not learn from Rabba? Many times I taught this baraita before the Master. And who is the Master? It is Rabba. And he said to me: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer; nevertheless, it is not in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer’s own opinion that a provisional guilt offering is brought as a gift offering, but rather it is in accordance with the opinion of those who spoke to Bava ben Buta. As we learned in the mishna: But they say to him: Wait until you enter into a situation of potential uncertainty. According to this opinion, one brings a provisional guilt offering for any manner of uncertain sin.

אָמַר רָבָא: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּאָמְרוּ לוֹ? אָמַר קְרָא: ״אֲשֶׁר לֹא תֵעָשֶׂינָה (בִּשְׁגָגָה) וְאָשֵׁם״.

Rava said: What is the reason for the opinion of those who spoke to Bava ben Buta and said that one may bring a provisional guilt offering for any uncertain sin, not only those stated by the Rabbis? With regard to a provisional guilt offering, the verse states: “And if anyone sins, and does any of the mitzvot of the Lord which may not be done, and he did not know, and he is guilty” (Leviticus 5:17). This indicates that one brings a provisional guilt offering for any form of sin.

אָמַר רָבָא: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבָּנַן, דְּאָמְרִי: אֵין מְבִיאִין אָשָׁם תָּלוּי אֶלָּא עַל דָּבָר שֶׁזְּדוֹנוֹ כָּרֵת וְשִׁגְגָתוֹ חַטָּאת? ״מִצְוֹת״ ״מִצְוֹת״, מֵחַטַּאת חֵלֶב,

Rava said: What is the reason for the opinion of the Rabbis, who say: One brings a provisional guilt offering only for the uncertain performance of a matter for whose intentional performance one is liable to receive karet and for whose unwitting performance one is liable to bring a sin offering? They derive this halakha by a verbal analogy between the word “mitzvot” with regard to a provisional guilt offering and the word “mitzvot” from a sin offering of forbidden fat, i.e., a standard sin offering, where it is written: “Any of the mitzvot of the Lord” (Leviticus 4:27).

מָה לְהַלָּן, שֶׁזְּדוֹנוֹ כָּרֵת וְשִׁגְגָתוֹ חַטָּאת, אַף כָּאן, דָּבָר שֶׁזְּדוֹנוֹ כָּרֵת וְשִׁגְגָתוֹ חַטָּאת.

The Gemara explains the verbal analogy: Just as there, it is referring to a sin for whose intentional performance one is liable to receive karet and for whose unwitting performance one is liable to bring a sin offering, so too here, a provisional guilt offering is brought for a matter for whose intentional performance one is liable to receive karet and for whose unwitting performance one is liable to bring a sin offering.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: חֲמִשָּׁה אֲשָׁמוֹת מְכַפְּרִין, אָשָׁם תָּלוּי אֵין מְכַפֵּר כַּפָּרָה גְּמוּרָה. מַאי קָאָמַר? אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף, הָכִי קָאָמַר: חֲמִשָּׁה אֲשָׁמוֹת מְכַפְּרִין כַּפָּרָה גְּמוּרָה, וְאָשָׁם תָּלוּי אֵין מְכַפֵּר כַּפָּרָה גְּמוּרָה.

§ The Sages taught in a baraita: Five guilt offerings atone, whereas a provisional guilt offering does not atone with a complete atonement. The Gemara asks: What is the tanna of this baraita saying? Rav Yosef said that this is what the baraita is saying: Five guilt offerings atone with a complete atonement to the extent that no further atonement is necessary, but a provisional guilt offering does not atone with a complete atonement, since if it later became known to him that he sinned, he must bring a sin offering to achieve atonement.

וּדְלָא כְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, דְּאָמַר: אָשָׁם תָּלוּי בָּא עַל הַנְּבֵלָה.

And this statement of the baraita is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, i.e., the opinion of those who spoke to Bava ben Buta, as they say: A provisional guilt offering may come for an uncertain eating of a non-kosher animal carcass. In the case of one who brought a provisional guilt offering for a sin such as the uncertain eating of an animal carcass and later found out that he sinned, he does not bring a sin offering and does not require any additional atonement.

רָבִינָא אָמַר: הָכִי קָתָנֵי: חֲמִשָּׁה אֲשָׁמוֹת – אֵין אַחֵר מְכַפֵּר כַּפָּרָתָן, דְּכִי מִתְיְידַע לֵיהּ מַיְיתֵי. אָשָׁם תָּלוּי – אַחֵר מְכַפֵּר כַּפָּרָתוֹ, דִּלְכִי מִתְיְידַע [לֵיהּ] לָא מַיְיתֵי, כְּדִתְנַן: חַיָּיבֵי חַטָּאוֹת וַאֲשָׁמוֹת וַדָּאִין שֶׁעָבַר עֲלֵיהֶן יוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים – חַיָּיבִין לְהָבִיא אַחַר יוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים. חַיָּיבֵי אֲשָׁמוֹת תְּלוּיִין – פְּטוּרִין.

Ravina said that this is what the baraita is teaching: With regard to five guilt offerings, nothing else achieves the atonement that they achieve, as one brings these offerings when it becomes known to him that he sinned. By contrast, with regard to a provisional guilt offering, another item achieves the atonement that it achieves, as one does not bring this offering when his uncertain sin becomes known to him. As we learned in the mishna: Those liable to bring sin offerings and definite guilt offerings for whom Yom Kippur has passed are liable to bring them after Yom Kippur, whereas those liable to bring provisional guilt offerings are exempt from bringing them after Yom Kippur.

חַיָּיבֵי חַטָּאוֹת וַאֲשָׁמוֹת וַדָּאִין כּוּ׳. קָתָנֵי: חַיָּיבֵי חַטָּאוֹת וַאֲשָׁמוֹת וַדָּאִין שֶׁעָבַר עֲלֵיהֶן יוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים – חַיָּיבִין לְהָבִיא לְאַחַר יוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים, חַיָּיבֵי אֲשָׁמוֹת תְּלוּיִין – פְּטוּרִין. מְנָהָנֵי מִילֵּי?

§ With regard to those liable to bring sin offerings and definite guilt offerings, the mishna teaches: Those liable to bring sin offerings and definite guilt offerings for whom Yom Kippur has passed are liable to bring them after Yom Kippur. By contrast, those liable to bring provisional guilt offerings are exempt from bringing them after Yom Kippur. The Gemara asks: From where is this matter derived, that Yom Kippur does not atone for those liable to bring sin offerings and definite guilt offerings?

כִּי אֲתָא רַב דִּימִי אָמַר רַבִּי אַמֵּי אָמַר רַבִּי חֲנִינָא: אֲמַר קְרָא: ״וְכִפֶּר עַל הַקֹּדֶשׁ מִטּוּמְאֹת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וּמִפִּשְׁעֵיהֶם לְכׇל חַטֹּאתָם״, חֲטָאִים דּוּמְיָא דִּפְשָׁעִים, מָה פְּשָׁעִים דְּלָאו בְּנֵי קׇרְבָּן – אַף חֲטָאִים דְּלָאו בְּנֵי קׇרְבָּן – מְכַפֵּר, אֲבָל חֲטָאִים בְּנֵי קׇרְבָּן – לָא מְכַפַּר.

When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael, he said that Rabbi Ami says that Rabbi Ḥanina says that the verse states with regard to Yom Kippur: “And he shall make atonement for the holy place, from the impurity of the children of Israel, and from their transgressions, for all their sins” (Leviticus 16:16). This indicates that sins, i.e., violations committed unwittingly, are similar to transgressions, violations committed intentionally: Just as Yom Kippur atones for transgressions, which are not subject to atonement through an offering, as personal sin offerings are brought only for unwitting sins, so too with regard to sins, Yom Kippur atones only for sins that are not subject to atonement through an offering, but Yom Kippur does not atone for sins that are subject to atonement through an offering.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: וְהָא כִּי כְּתִיב הָדֵין קָרָא בְּשָׂעִיר הַנַּעֲשֶׂה בִּפְנִים הוּא דִּכְתִיב, דְּלָא מְכַפַּר עַל עֲבֵירוֹת דְּמִצְוָה יְדוּעָה, אֲבָל שָׂעִיר הַמִּשְׁתַּלֵּחַ, דִּמְכַפַּר עַל עֲבֵירוֹת דְּמִצְוָה יְדוּעָה, אֵימָא לָךְ: אֲפִילּוּ עַל חֲטָאִים דִּבְנֵי קׇרְבָּן נִינְהוּ מְכַפַּר!

Abaye said to Rav Dimi: But how can one derive this matter from the verse? When that verse is written, it is written with regard to the goat whose blood presentation is performed inside the Sanctuary on Yom Kippur,which does not atone for a known violation of a mitzva, but only for a violation that is unknown. Perhaps only that offering does not atone for sins that are subject to atonement through an offering, but with regard to the scapegoat that is dispatched to Azazel, which atones for a known violation of a mitzva, I could say to you that it atones even for those sins that are subject to atonement through an offering.

אֶלָּא אָמַר אַבָּיֵי, מֵהָכָא: ״וְהִתְוַדָּה עָלָיו [אֶת] כׇּל עֲוֹנוֹת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וְאֶת כׇּל פִּשְׁעֵיהֶם לְכׇל חַטֹּאתָם״, חֲטָאִים דּוּמְיָא דִּפְשָׁעִים, מָה פְּשָׁעִים דְּלָאו בְּנֵי קׇרְבָּן – אַף חֲטָאִים דְּלָאו בְּנֵי קׇרְבָּן, אֲבָל חֲטָאִים דִּבְנֵי קׇרְבָּן נִינְהוּ – לָא מְכַפַּר. וּמַיעֲטֵיהּ קְרָא בְּשָׂעִיר הַמִּשְׁתַּלֵּחַ, לְמֵימְרָא דְּעַל חֲטָאִים דִּבְנֵי קׇרְבָּן נִינְהוּ לָא מְכַפַּר.

Rather, Abaye said that the matter is derived from here, a verse that deals with the scapegoat: “And he shall confess over it all the iniquities of the children of Israel, and all their transgressions, for all their sins” (Leviticus 16:21). This indicates that sins are similar to transgressions: Just as the scapegoat atones for transgressions, which are not subject to atonement through an offering, so too with regard to sins, the scapegoat atones only for sins that are not subject to atonement through an offering, but it does not atone for sins that are subject to atonement through an offering. And the verse limited the scope of atonement specifically with regard to the scapegoat, in order to say that despite the scapegoat’s greater capacity to achieve atonement, it does not atone for sins that are subject to atonement through an offering.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב דִּימִי: מִמַּאי דְּהָנֵי פְּשָׁעִים לָאו בְּנֵי קׇרְבָּן נִינְהוּ? דִּלְמָא הָנֵי דִּבְנֵי קׇרְבָּן נִינְהוּ, כְּדִתְנַן: אַרְבָּעָה מְבִיאִין עַל הַזָּדוֹן כִּשְׁגָגָה.

Rav Dimi said to Abaye: From where is it known that those transgressions mentioned in that verse are not subject to atonement through an offering? Perhaps those transgressions are subject to atonement through an offering, as we learned in a mishna (9a): There are four who bring an offering for an intentional transgression as they do for an unwitting sin: One who engages in intercourse with an espoused maidservant, a nazirite who became ritually impure, one who falsely takes the oath of testimony that he does not know testimony on behalf of another, and one who falsely takes the oath on a deposit that the item belonging to another is not in his possession. The Gemara does not provide Abaye’s answer to this question at this point.

אִיתְּמַר נָמֵי: כִּי אֲתָא רָבִין, אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: ״וְהִתְוַדָּה עָלָיו אֶת כׇּל עֲוֹנוֹת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וְאֶת כׇּל פִּשְׁעֵיהֶם לְכׇל חַטֹּאתָם״, חֲטָאִים דּוּמְיָא דִּפְשָׁעִים, מָה פְּשָׁעִים דְּלָאו בְּנֵי קׇרְבָּן מְכַפֵּר, אַף חֲטָאִים דְּלָאו בְּנֵי קׇרְבָּן מְכַפֵּר, אֲבָל חֲטָאִים דִּבְנֵי קׇרְבָּן – לָא מְכַפַּר.

It was also stated with regard to this matter that when Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael he related a statement that Rabbi Yosei says that Reish Lakish says: The verse states: “And he shall confess over it all the iniquities of the children of Israel, and all their transgressions, for all their sins” (Leviticus 16:21). This indicates that sins are similar to transgressions: Just as the scapegoat atones for transgressions, which are not subject to atonement through an offering, so too with regard to sins, the scapegoat atones only for sins that are not subject to atonement through an offering, but it does not atone for sins that are subject to atonement through an offering.

אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: אֲנָא נָמֵי מֵהָדֵין קְרָא אָמְרִי, וְאַקְשִׁי לִי רַב דִּימִי: מִמַּאי דְּהָנֵי פְּשָׁעִים דְּלָאו בְּנֵי קׇרְבָּן נִינְהוּ? דִּלְמָא הָנָךְ דִּבְנֵי קׇרְבָּן נִינְהוּ, כְּדִתְנַן: אַרְבָּעָה מְבִיאִין עַל הַזָּדוֹן כִּשְׁגָגָה! אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבִין: רוֹב פְּשָׁעִים לָאו בְּנֵי קׇרְבָּן. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מִידֵי רוֹב כְּתִיב?

Abaye said: I also said that this halakha was derived from that verse, and Rav Dimi raised the following difficulty before me: From where is it known that those transgressions mentioned in the verse are not subject to atonement through an offering? Perhaps those transgressions are subject to atonement through an offering, as we learned in a mishna that there are four who bring an offering for an intentional transgression as they do for an unwitting sin. Ravin said to Abaye: The majority of transgressions are not subject to atonement through an offering. Abaye said to him: Is the term majority written in that verse?

אֶלָּא אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: מֵרֵישֵׁיהּ דִּקְרָא: ״וְהִתְוַדָּה עָלָיו אֶת כׇּל עֲוֹנוֹת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל״, וְתַנְיָא: ״עֲוֹנוֹת״ – אֵלּוּ זְדוֹנוֹת. וְכֵן הוּא אוֹמֵר: ״עֲוֹנָהּ בָּהּ״.

Rather, Abaye said that an answer to Rav Dimi’s question can be inferred from the beginning of the verse: “And he shall confess over it all the iniquities of the children of Israel” (Leviticus 16:21), and it is taught in a baraita: The term “iniquities” is referring to those sins that were performed intentionally. And similarly, the verse states: “Because he despised the word of the Lord, and has broken His commandment; that soul shall utterly be cut off, his iniquity shall be upon him” (Numbers 15:31).

״וְאֶת כׇּל פִּשְׁעֵיהֶם לְכׇל חַטֹּאתָם״ – ״כׇּל״ לְמָה לִי? לְאַקְשׁוֹיֵי לִפְשָׁעִים, מָה פְּשָׁעִים דְּלָאו בְּנֵי קׇרְבָּן, אַף חֲטָאִים דְּלָאו בְּנֵי קׇרְבָּן, אֲבָל חֲטָאִים דִּבְנֵי קׇרְבָּן נִינְהוּ – לָא מְכַפַּר.

Abaye continues: If so, when it states: “And all their transgressions, for all their sins,” why do I need the verse to mention “all their transgressions,” which is also referring to sins that were intentionally performed? It is written to juxtapose sins to transgressions: Just as the scapegoat atones for transgressions, the majority of which are not subject to atonement through an offering, so too with regard to sins, it atones only for sins that are not subject to atonement through an offering, but it does not atone for sins that are subject to atonement through an offering.

חַיָּיבֵי אֲשָׁמוֹת תְּלוּיִין כּוּ׳. מְנָהָנֵי מִילֵּי? אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר, אֲמַר קְרָא: ״מִכֹּל חַטֹּאתֵיכֶם לִפְנֵי ה׳ וְגוֹ׳״ – חֵטְא שֶׁאֵין מַכִּיר בּוֹ אֶלָּא הַמָּקוֹם – יוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים מְכַפֵּר.

§ The mishna teaches: Those liable to bring provisional guilt offerings are exempt from bringing them after Yom Kippur. The Gemara asks: From where is this matter derived? Rabbi Elazar said: With regard to Yom Kippur the verse states: “For on this day shall atonement be made for you, to cleanse you; from all your sins you shall be pure before the Lord” (Leviticus 16:30). This indicates that Yom Kippur atones for a sin of which only the Omnipresent is aware, i.e., an uncertain sin that renders one liable to bring a provisional guilt offering.

אָמַר רַב תַּחְלִיפָא אֲבוּהּ דְּרַב הוּנָא בַּר תַּחְלִיפָא מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרָבָא: קַדְמָיְיתָא נָמֵי לָא תֵּיתֵי

Rav Taḥlifa, father of Rav Huna bar Taḥlifa, said in the name of Rava: With regard to the first clause in the mishna as well: Those liable to bring sin offerings and definite guilt offerings for whom Yom Kippur has passed are liable to bring them after Yom Kippur, one cannot bring a convincing proof