תמורה כה

תמורה כה

אַמַּאי אֵין קְדוּשָּׁה חָלָה עֲלֵיהֶן? קָסָבַר רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל: וַלְדוֹת קָדָשִׁים בַּהֲוָיָיתָן הֵן קְדוֹשִׁין, דְּאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ מִמְּעֵי אִמָּן הֵן קְדוֹשִׁין — אַמַּאי אֵין קְדוּשָּׁה חָלָה עֲלֵיהֶן? הָא תְּפַסְתִּינְהוּ קְדוּשָּׁה דְּאִימַּיְיהוּ! אֶלָּא שְׁמַע מִינָּה: וַלְדֵי קָדָשִׁים בַּהֲוָיָיתָן הֵן קְדוֹשִׁים.

The Gemara asks: Why aren’t they imbued with the sanctity of the mother? The Gemara answers: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that the offspring of sacrificial animals are imbued with sanctity only as they come into being, i.e., from the moment they are born. As, if it enters your mind that they are sanctified already in the womb of their mother, why are they not imbued with the sanctity of the mother? After all, the sanctity of their mother has taken hold of them. Rather, learn from it that the offspring of sacrificial animals are sanctified only as they come into being.

וְהַאי תַּנָּא סָבַר וַלְדֵי קָדָשִׁים מִמְּעֵי אִמָּן הֵן קְדוֹשִׁים, דְּתָנוּ רַבָּנַן: אִילּוּ לֹא נֶאֱמַר ״בְּכוֹר לֹא יַקְדִּישׁ״ הָיִיתִי אוֹמֵר בְּכוֹר לֹא יַקְדִּישׁ הֶקְדֵּישׁוֹת, תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״אִישׁ אוֹתוֹ״ — אוֹתוֹ אִי אַתָּה מַקְדִּישׁ, אֲבָל מַקְדִּישׁ אָדָם בְּכוֹר הֶקְדֵּישׁוֹת.

And this tanna disagrees with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and holds that the offspring of sacrificial animals are sanctified in the womb of their mother. As the Sages taught in a baraita: It is written with regard to a firstborn: “But the firstborn among animals, which is born as a firstling to the Lord, man shall not consecrate it” (Leviticus 27:26). If that verse were not complete but merely stated: The firstborn shall not consecrate, I would have said that the verse is teaching that a firstborn man shall not consecrate non-sacred items. Therefore, the verse states: “Man shall not consecrate it,” i.e., you may not consecrate it, a firstborn animal, but a firstborn man may consecrate non-sacred items.

וַעֲדַיִין אֲנִי אוֹמֵר: הוּא לֹא יַקְדִּישׁ, אֲבָל יַקְדִּישׁוּהוּ אֲחֵרִים. תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״בִּבְהֵמָה״ — בִּבְהֵמָה עָסַקְתִּי.

But still, I would say that specifically a firstborn man may not consecrate a firstborn animal with a different sanctity, but others who are not firstborns may consecrate a firstborn animal. Therefore, the verse states: “Among animals,” indicating that I am dealing with firstborn animals, not firstborn men, i.e., the verse is teaching that all people are prohibited to consecrate a firstborn animal with a different sanctity that that of a firstborn.

יָכוֹל לֹא יַקְדִּישֶׁנּוּ בַּבֶּטֶן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״אֲשֶׁר יְבֻכַּר לַה׳״ — מִשֶּׁיְּבוּכַּר לַה׳ אִי אַתָּה מַקְדִּישׁ, אֲבָל אַתָּה מַקְדִּישׁ בַּבֶּטֶן.

The baraita continues: One might have thought that one also cannot consecrate the fetus of an animal pregnant with its firstborn while the fetus is still in the womb of its mother. Therefore, the verse states: “Which is born as a firstling to the Lord,” indicating that from the time the animal is born and consecrated to the Lord as a firstborn you cannot consecrate it with a different sanctity, but you may consecrate it with a different sanctity while it is still in the womb.

יָכוֹל אַף וַלְדֵי כׇּל הַקֳּדָשִׁים כֵּן, תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״אַךְ״ — חָלַק, אַלְמָא סְבִירָא לֵיהּ וַלְדֵי קָדָשִׁים מִמְּעֵי אִמָּן הֵן קְדוֹשִׁין.

One might have thought that even with regard to the offspring of all other consecrated animals it is so, that one may consecrate them with a different sanctity when they are still in the womb. Therefore, the verse states: “But [akh],” which distinguished between a firstborn animal, which one may consecrate with a different sanctity while it is still in the womb, and the offspring of other consecrated animals, which one may not consecrate with a different sanctity even when they are in the womb. Evidently, this tanna holds that the offspring of sacrificial animals are sanctified in the womb of their mother.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב עַמְרָם לְרַב שֵׁשֶׁת: אָמַר עַל הַבְּכוֹר ״עִם יְצִיאַת רוּבּוֹ — עוֹלָה״, עוֹלָה הָוֵי אוֹ בְּכוֹר הָוֵי?

§ The mishna teaches that one may employ artifice to circumvent the obligation to give the firstborn to the priest by consecrating the fetus as a burnt offering before the time of birth, which is the point at which the animal becomes sanctified as a firstborn. Rav Amram said to Rav Sheshet: If an owner said with regard to the fetus of an animal pregnant with its firstborn: This fetus will be consecrated as a burnt offering at the same time that the sanctity of the firstborn takes effect, which is when the majority of the animal leaves the womb, what is the status of the offspring? Is the offspring a burnt offering or is it a firstborn?

עוֹלָה הָוֵי, דְּכׇל פּוּרְתָּא וּפוּרְתָּא דְּקָא נָפֵיק הָוֵי כָּלִיל, אוֹ בְּכוֹר הָוֵי, דְּכׇל פּוּרְתָּא וּפוּרְתָּא דְּקָא נָפֵיק בְּמִילְּתֵיהּ הוּא?

The Gemara explains the dilemma: Is it a burnt offering, as the sanctity of a burnt offering is more stringent than the sanctity of a firstborn and therefore each and every bit that exits the womb becomes a burnt offering, which is entirely consumed upon the altar? Or perhaps it is a firstborn, because normally the sanctity of the firstborn takes effect at the moment of birth, and therefore with regard to each and every bit of the animal that exits the womb, its status is that of a firstborn.

לִישָּׁנָא אַחְרִינָא: שֶׁכֵּן קְדוּשָּׁה חָיְילָא עֲלֵיהּ, אוֹ דִלְמָא בְּכוֹר הָוֵי — שֶׁכֵּן קְדוּשָּׁתוֹ מֵרֶחֶם.

The Gemara cites another version of the explanation of the dilemma: Is it a burnt offering because it is imbued with the more stringent sanctity of a burnt offering? Or perhaps it is a firstborn because God declared its sanctity as a firstborn upon exiting from the womb.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מַאי תִּיבְּעֵי לָךְ? הַיְינוּ דְּבָעֵי אִילְפָא: אָמַר עַל הַלֶּקֶט ״עִם נְשִׁירַת רוּבּוֹ — יְהֵא הֶפְקֵר״, לֶקֶט הָוֵי אוֹ הֶפְקֵר הָוֵי?

Rav Sheshet said to Rav Amram: What is your dilemma? Your dilemma is the same as that dilemma which Ilfa raised: With regard to the gleanings left for the poor, which the wealthy may not take, if the owner of a field at the harvest time said: This grain that is now on the stalk will become ownerless property, meaning that even the wealthy can acquire it, at precisely the same time as the halakha of gleanings left for the poor takes effect, which is when the majority of the grain falls off the stalk, what is the status of the grain after it falls off the stalk? Is it gleanings left for the poor or is it ownerless property that even the wealthy may take?

לֶקֶט הָוֵי, שֶׁכֵּן קְדוּשָּׁתוֹ בִּידֵי שָׁמַיִם, אוֹ דִלְמָא הֶפְקֵר הָוֵי, שֶׁכֵּן זוֹכִין בּוֹ עֲנִיִּים וַעֲשִׁירִים?

The Gemara explains the dilemma: Is it gleanings, as its sanctity is dictated by the hand of Heaven at the moment that the grain falls off the stalk? Or perhaps it is ownerless property, because that status is more inclusive, as both the poor and the wealthy may acquire the grain.

וְאָמַר אַבָּיֵי: מַאי תִּיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ? דִּבְרֵי הָרַב וְדִבְרֵי תַּלְמִיד — דִּבְרֵי מִי שׁוֹמְעִים? הָכִי נָמֵי: דִּבְרֵי מִי שׁוֹמְעִים?

And Abaye said in response to Ilfa’s dilemma: What is your dilemma? When there is a conflict between the statement of the Master, i.e., God, who commanded that the grain become gleanings for the poor, and the statement of the student, the one who declared the grain to be ownerless property that may be acquired even by the wealthy, to whose statement should one listen? So too, with regard to Rav Amram’s dilemma, when there is a conflict between the statement of God and the statement of the student, to whose statement should one listen? Accordingly, the fetus is consecrated with the sanctity of a firstborn, not that of a burnt offering.

מַתְנִי׳ הָאוֹמֵר ״וְלָדָהּ שֶׁל זוֹ עוֹלָה, וְהִיא שְׁלָמִים״ — דְּבָרָיו קַיָּימִים. ״הִיא שְׁלָמִים, וּוְלָדָהּ עוֹלָה״ — הֲרֵי זֶה וְלַד זִבְחֵי שְׁלָמִים, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר.

MISHNA: One who says: The offspring of this non-sacred animal is a burnt offering and the animal itself is a peace offering, his statement stands, i.e., is effective. If he says: The animal itself is a peace offering and its offspring is a burnt offering, then since consecration of the mother preceded consecration of the offspring, it is the offspring of a peace offering, whose halakhic status is that of a peace offering; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי: אִם לְכֵן נִתְכַּוֵּין תְּחִלָּה, הוֹאִיל וְאִי אֶפְשָׁר לִקְרוֹת שְׁנֵי שֵׁמוֹת כְּאַחַת — דְּבָרָיו קַיָּימִין, וְאִם מִשֶּׁאָמַר ״הֲרֵי זוֹ שְׁלָמִים״ נִמְלַךְ וְאָמַר ״וְלָדָהּ עוֹלָה״ — הֲרֵי זוֹ וְלָדָהּ שְׁלָמִים.

Rabbi Yosei said: If that was his intent from the outset, to designate the offspring as a burnt offering when he designated the mother as a peace offering, then since it is impossible to call it by two designations simultaneously, his statement stands, and the mother is a peace offering and the offspring a burnt offering. And if it was only after he said: This animal is hereby a peace offering, that he reconsidered and said: Its offspring is a burnt offering, that offspring is a peace offering, as before he reconsidered, the offspring had already assumed the status of the offspring of a peace offering.

גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הִפְרִישׁ חַטָּאת מְעוּבֶּרֶת וְיָלְדָה — רָצָה בָּהּ מִתְכַּפֵּר, רָצָה בִּוְלָדָהּ מִתְכַּפֵּר.

GEMARA: Rabbi Yoḥanan says: In the case of one who separated a pregnant animal as a sin offering and that animal later gave birth to a female, both animals are consecrated as sin offerings. If he wishes he may achieve atonement by sacrificing the mother itself, and if he wishes he may achieve atonement by sacrificing the offspring. Since he consecrated the animal when it was already pregnant, his act of consecration took effect with regard to both the mother and the offspring.

מַאי טַעְמָא? קָסָבַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: אִם שִׁיְּירוֹ — מְשׁוּיָּיר.

What is the reason for this halakha? Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that in the case of one who consecrated a pregnant animal, if he reserved the fetus and designated it as non-sacred, e.g., he said: The fetus is non-sacred and the animal itself is designated as a sin offering, then the offspring is considered reserved and is non-sacred, despite the fact that the mother is consecrated.

עוּבָּר לָאו יֶרֶךְ אִמּוֹ הוּא, דְּהָוֵה לֵיהּ כְּמַפְרִישׁ שְׁתֵּי חַטָּאוֹת לְאַחְרָיוּת — רָצָה מִתְכַּפֵּר בָּהּ, רָצָה מִתְכַּפֵּר בַּחֲבֶירְתָּהּ.

The reason is that Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that a fetus is not considered the thigh, i.e., a part, of its mother. Therefore, just as one can reserve the fetus from being consecrated with its mother, so too, one can consecrate the fetus with a separate sanctity than that of the mother. Consequently, this case is like that of one who separates two sin offerings as a guarantee; if he wishes he may gain atonement with one of them, and if he wishes he may gain atonement with the other.

מוֹתֵיב רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: ״הִיא שְׁלָמִים וּוְלָדָהּ עוֹלָה״ — הֲרֵי זֶה וְלַד שְׁלָמִים, וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ שִׁיְּירוֹ מְשׁוּיָּיר, ״הֲרֵי זֶה וְלַד שְׁלָמִים״ — ״הֲרֵי זוֹ שְׁלָמִים״ בָּעֵי מִיתְנָא!

Rabbi Elazar raises an objection from the mishna: If one says: The animal itself is a peace offering and its offspring is a burnt offering, then it is the offspring of a peace offering. And if it enters your mind that if one reserved the fetus from the consecration of the mother it is considered reserved, and its sanctity is independent from that of the mother, why does the mishna state with regard to the offspring that it is the offspring of a peace offering, which indicates that it receives its sanctity from that of the mother? The mishna should teach that the offspring is a peace offering with an independent sanctity.

אָמַר רַב טַבְלָא: בַּר מִינַּהּ דְּהַהִיא, הָא אָמַר רַב לְתַנָּא: תְּנִי ״הֲרֵי זוֹ שְׁלָמִים״.

Rav Tavla said: The discussion of this topic should be held apart from this version of the mishna, as it is incorrect. Didn’t Rav say to the tanna who was reciting mishnayot that he should not recite the mishna with the phrase: It is the offspring of a peace offering, but rather, he should teach: It is a peace offering.

מֵיתִיבִי: הָאוֹמֵר לְשִׁפְחָתוֹ ״הֲרֵי אֶת שִׁפְחָה, וּוְלָדֵךְ בֶּן חוֹרִין״, אִם הָיְתָה עוּבָּרָה — זָכְתָה לוֹ.

The Gemara raises another objection to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement from a baraita: One who says to his Canaanite maidservant: You are hereby still a maidservant but your unborn child is a freeman, and he writes a bill of manumission for the child and places it in her hand, if she was pregnant at that time, then she acquired freedom for the unborn child.

אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא אִם שִׁיְּירוֹ אֵינוֹ מְשׁוּיָּיר, עוּבָּר יֶרֶךְ אִמּוֹ, מִשּׁוּם הָכִי זָכְתָה לוֹ, וְהָוֵי לֵיהּ כִּמְשַׁחְרֵר חֲצִי עַבְדּוֹ. וּמַנִּי? רַבִּי מֵאִיר הִיא, כִּדְתַנְיָא:

The Gemara explains the objection: Granted, if you say that if one reserved a certain consecration it is not considered reserved, and therefore the sanctity of the mother takes effect on her offspring, and likewise that a fetus is considered the thigh of its mother, it is due to that reason that she acquired freedom for the unborn child. And the explanation is that this case is like that of one who emancipates half of his slave, as that half is thereby emancipated. And whose opinion is this? It is the opinion of Rabbi Meir, as it is taught in a baraita:

הַמְשַׁחְרֵר חֲצִי עַבְדּוֹ יָצָא לְחֵירוּת, גִּיטּוֹ וְיָדוֹ בָּאִין כְּאֶחָת.

With regard to a master who emancipates half of his slave, half of the slave is emancipated, and he is a half-slave half-freeman. Although a slave does not have the ability to acquire items, in this case he does acquire his freedom because his bill of manumission and his ability to acquire himself come at the same time.

וְאִי אָמְרַתְּ: שִׁיְּירוֹ מְשׁוּיָּיר, עוּבָּר לָאו יֶרֶךְ אִמּוֹ הוּא, אַמַּאי זָכְתָה לוֹ? וְהָא תַּנְיָא: נִרְאִין שֶׁהָעֶבֶד זוֹכֶה לְקַבֵּל גֵּט שִׁחְרוּר שֶׁל חֲבֵרוֹ מִיָּד רַבּוֹ שֶׁאֵינוֹ שֶׁלּוֹ, וְלֹא מִיַּד רַבּוֹ שֶׁלּוֹ. אֶלָּא שְׁמַע מִינָּה: אִם שִׁיְּירוֹ אֵינוֹ מְשׁוּיָּיר, וּתְיוּבְתָּא דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן תְּיוּבְתָּא.

But if you say that if one reserved a consecration it is considered reserved, and a fetus is not considered the thigh of its mother, but the mother and the fetus are separate entities, why does the mother acquire freedom for the fetus in a case where the master freed the fetus but not the mother? The Gemara continues: And isn’t it taught in a baraita: It appears to be the case that a slave can acquire a bill of manumission for another slave from the hand of his fellow’s master who is not also his own master, but not from the hand of his own master, i.e., not if both of them are enslaved to the same person. Here too, how can the mother receive the bill of manumission for the fetus from the hand of their shared master? Rather, conclude from it that if he reserved a consecration it is not considered reserved, and the refutation of the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan is indeed a conclusive refutation.

לֵימָא אִם שִׁיְּירוֹ מְשׁוּיָּיר תַּנָּאֵי הִיא? דְּתַנְיָא: הָאוֹמֵר לְשִׁפְחָתוֹ ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ בַּת חוֹרִין וּוְלָדֵךְ עֶבֶד״ — וְלָדָהּ כָּמוֹהָ, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: דְּבָרָיו קַיָּימִין, מִשּׁוּם שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״הָאִשָּׁה וִילָדֶיהָ תִּהְיֶה לַאדוֹנֶיהָ״.

The Gemara suggests: Shall we say that the claim that if one reserved a consecration it is reserved is subject to a dispute between tanna’im? As it is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who says to his pregnant Canaanite maidservant: You are hereby a free woman but your offspring shall remain a slave, the offspring is emancipated like her. This is the statement of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili. And the Rabbis say: His statement is upheld. This is because it is stated: “The woman and her children shall be her master’s” (Exodus 21:4).

קְרָא מַאי תַּלְמוּדָא לְרַבָּנַן? אָמַר רָבָא: אָמַר קְרָא לְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי, דְּקָתָנֵי וְלָדָהּ כָּמוֹהָ, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״הָאִשָּׁה וִילָדֶיהָ תִּהְיֶה לַאדוֹנֶיהָ״ — בִּזְמַן שֶׁהָאִשָּׁה לַאֲדוֹנֶיהָ, וְלָדָהּ לַאֲדוֹנֶיהָ.

The Gemara expresses surprise at this ruling: What is the derivation of the verse here that indicates support for the opinion of the Rabbis, who rule in this case that the child of a freed maidservant remains a slave? Rava said: The verse does not support the opinion of the Rabbis; rather, the verse that the baraita states is cited as support for the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, as it teaches, i.e., the baraita should be understood as follows: The offspring is emancipated like her, as it is stated: “The woman and her children shall be her master’s,” which indicates that when the woman belongs to the master her offspring likewise belongs to the master, but if the woman is freed the offspring is also freed.

מַאי לַָאו בְּהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי, דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי סָבַר: שִׁיְּירוֹ — אֵינוֹ מְשׁוּיָּיר, וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: מְשׁוּיָּיר?

What, is it not correct to say that the Sages disagree over this point, that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili holds that if he reserved it, it is not considered reserved, and therefore the mother and the fetus are treated as one entity, and the Rabbis maintain that it is considered reserved. If so, this would mean that Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion is the subject of a dispute between tanna’im.

אָמַר לָךְ רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא שִׁיְּירוֹ — מְשׁוּיָּיר, וְהָכָא הַיְינוּ טַעְמָא דְּאָמַר קְרָא ״הָאִשָּׁה וִילָדֶיהָ תִּהְיֶה לַאֲדוֹנֶיהָ״.

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: Rabbi Yoḥanan could have said to you that everyone holds that if he reserved it, it is considered reserved, and here this is the reason that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili rules that the offspring is freed with the mother, as Rabbi Yosei HaGelili himself explains: It is that the verse states: “The woman and her children shall be her master’s.” This verse teaches that the status of the offspring follows the status of the mother with regard to slavery, but not because the fetus is considered a part of its mother.

אֶלָּא וַדַּאי לֵימָא כִּי הָנֵי תַּנָּאֵי, דְּתַנְיָא: הַשּׁוֹחֵט אֶת הַחַטָּאת וּמָצָא בָּהּ בֶּן אַרְבָּעָה חַי, תָּנֵי חֲדָא: אֵין נֶאֱכֶלֶת אֶלָּא לְזִכְרֵי כְהוּנָּה, וְאֵינָהּ נֶאֱכֶלֶת אֶלָּא לְיוֹם אֶחָד, וְאֵינָהּ נֶאֱכֶלֶת אֶלָּא לִפְנִים מִן הַקְּלָעִים.

Rather, certainly we shall say that the opinion that if he reserved it, it is reserved, is subject to a dispute between these tanna’im, as it is taught that there are two baraitot that discuss the case of one who slaughters a sin offering, which is assumed to have been consecrated when it was pregnant, and he found a four-month-old fetus alive inside. It is taught in one baraita: The slaughter of the mother is also considered a slaughter with regard to the fetus, and therefore the fetus is considered a sin offering. This means that its meat is eaten only by males of the priesthood, and it is eaten only for one day, and it is eaten only inside the curtains. In the Tabernacle in the wilderness this area was surrounded by curtains. The corresponding area in the Temple is the courtyard.

וְתַנְיָא אִידַּךְ: נֶאֱכֶלֶת לְכׇל אָדָם, וְנֶאֱכֶלֶת בְּכׇל מָקוֹם, וְנֶאֱכֶלֶת לְעוֹלָם.

And it is taught in another baraita: The slaughter of the mother is also considered a slaughter for the fetus to the extent that it permits it to be eaten, but the fetus is non-sacred, and therefore it may be eaten by any person, and may be eaten in any place, and may be eaten forever, with no time limit.

מַאי לָאו תַּנָּאֵי, דְּתַנָּא קַמָּא סָבַר: ״שִׁיְּירוֹ״ — אֵינוֹ מְשׁוּיָּיר, וּמָר סָבַר: ״שִׁיְּירוֹ״ — מְשׁוּיָּיר.

What, is it not correct to say that these tanna’im disagree over this point, that the first tanna holds: If he reserved it, it is not considered reserved, and therefore the mother and the fetus are considered one entity and the status of the mother applies to the fetus; and the Sage in the second baraita holds: If he reserved it, it is considered reserved, which means that the fetus is considered an independent entity and is non-sacred. If so, Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion is the subject of a dispute between tanna’im.

אָמַר לָךְ רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא אִם שִׁיְּירוֹ — מְשׁוּיָּיר, וְהָנֵי תַּנָּאֵי בְּהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי, דְּמָר סָבַר: וַלְדֵי קָדָשִׁים בַּהֲוָיָיתָן הֵן קְדוֹשִׁים, וּמָר סָבַר: וַלְדֵי קָדָשִׁים בִּמְעֵי אִמָּן הֵן קְדוֹשִׁים.

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: Rabbi Yoḥanan could say to you that everyone holds that if he reserved it, it is considered reserved, and therefore a person can consecrate an animal while reserving the fetus as non-sacred. And these tanna’im disagree over this following point: In the case of an animal that was consecrated as a sin offering and only then became pregnant, one Sage holds: The offspring of sacrificial animals become consecrated when they are born and come into being, and as that fetus which was found alive inside the mother was never born, it never became consecrated. And one Sage holds: The offspring of sacrificial animals become consecrated in the womb of their mother, which means that the fetus that was found alive inside the mother was already consecrated.

וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: לָא קַשְׁיָא, כָּאן — בְּשֶׁהִקְדִּישָׁהּ וּלְבַסּוֹף נִתְעַבְּרָה,

If you wish, say instead an alternative explanation of the dispute between these two baraitot: It is not difficult for Rabbi Yoḥanan. Everyone holds that if he reserved it, it is considered reserved, and everyone also maintains that offspring of sacrificial animals become consecrated when they are born. Rather, these two baraitot are discussing two different cases. Here, the second baraita is referring to a case where the owner consecrated the animal before it became pregnant and only afterward it became pregnant. Consequently, the offspring is non-sacred, as it was not in the womb when the mother was consecrated, and as it was never born, it was not consecrated at the moment of birth either.

כָּאן — בְּשֶׁנִּתְעַבְּרָה וּלְבַסּוֹף הִקְדִּישָׁהּ.

By contrast, there, the first baraita is referring to a case where the animal first became pregnant and afterward the owner consecrated it. Since the owner did not reserve the fetus from the consecration of the mother, the fetus was consecrated as a sin offering together with the mother.

מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רָבָא: מִמַּאי דְּטַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אִם שִׁיְּירוֹ מְשׁוּיָּיר? דִלְמָא הַיְינוּ טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן דְּאָדָם מִתְכַּפֵּר בְּשֶׁבַח הֶקְדֵּשׁ.

Rava objects to this claim: From where is it known that the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan is that if he reserved it, it is considered reserved? Perhaps Rabbi Yoḥanan maintains that if he reserved it, it is not considered reserved, and this is the reason for the ruling of Rabbi Yoḥanan: It is that one can achieve atonement with the offspring of a pregnant animal he set aside as a sin offering, as he maintains that a person can achieve atonement with the enhancement of consecrated property, and the fetus is considered an enhancement of consecrated property.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב הַמְנוּנָא: רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר תַּלְמִידֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, וְיָתֵיב לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, וְלָא אַהְדַּר לֵיהּ הַאי שִׁינּוּיָא, וְאַתְּ אָמְרַתְּ טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן מִשּׁוּם דְּאָדָם מִתְכַּפֵּר בְּשֶׁבַח הֶקְדֵּשׁ?!

Rav Hamnuna said to Rava: Rabbi Elazar was the pupil of Rabbi Yoḥanan, and he sat before Rabbi Yoḥanan, and Rabbi Elazar assumed that the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan was that he held that if he reserved it, it is considered reserved, and he questioned Rabbi Yoḥanan himself about his statement based on that assumption. And Rabbi Yoḥanan did not answer him with this answer, i.e., that the real reason for his opinion is that a person can achieve atonement with an enhancement of consecrated property. And if so, how can you say that the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan is that a person can achieve atonement with the enhancement of consecrated property? Therefore, it must be that the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan is that he held that if he reserved it, it is considered reserved.

אִם מִשֶּׁאָמַר ״הֲרֵי זוֹ שְׁלָמִים״ נִמְלַךְ כּוּ׳. פְּשִׁיטָא וְלָדָן שְׁלָמִים, אֶלָּא כֹּל אֵימַת דְּבָעֵי מִימְּלֵךְ?

§ The mishna teaches: And if it was only after he said: This animal is hereby a peace offering, that he reconsidered and said: Its offspring is a burnt offering, that offspring is a peace offering, as before he reconsidered the offspring had already assumed the status of the offspring of a peace offering. The Gemara asks: If he reconsidered after saying: This animal is a peace offering, it is obvious that he cannot remove the status he already applied to the animal, and that the offspring remains a peace offering. Can one change his mind anytime that he wants?

אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: לֹא נִצְרְכָה אֶלָּא שֶׁאָמַר בְּתוֹךְ כְּדֵי דִּיבּוּר, מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא תּוֹךְ כְּדֵי דִיבּוּר כְּדִיבּוּר, וְהַאי עַיּיוֹנֵי הוּא דְּקָמְעַיֵּין — קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

Rav Pappa said: This halakha is necessary only in a case where he reconsidered and said: Its offspring is a burnt offering, within the time required for speaking a short phrase. Lest you say: The halakhic status of a pause that lasts less than the time required for speaking a short phrase is like that of continuous speech, and therefore the offspring is a burnt offering, and that time he was merely prolonging his thought but not changing his mind; consequently, the mishna teaches us that he changed his mind and it is not considered continuous speech.

מַתְנִי׳ ״הֲרֵי זוֹ תְּמוּרַת עוֹלָה תְּמוּרַת שְׁלָמִים״ — הֲרֵי זוֹ תְּמוּרַת עוֹלָה, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר.

MISHNA: If one had two animals standing before him, one a burnt offering and the other a peace offering, and he said with regard to a third, non-sacred animal: This animal is hereby the substitute of the burnt offering, the substitute of the peace offering, that animal is the substitute of the burnt offering. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Once he designated it as the substitute of the burnt offering, his initial statement takes effect and the animal assumes the sanctity of the burnt offering.

אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי: אִם לְכֵן נִתְכַּוֵּין תְּחִלָּה, הוֹאִיל וְאִי אֶפְשָׁר לִקְרוֹת שְׁנֵי שֵׁמוֹת כְּאַחַת — דְּבָרָיו קַיָּימִים, וְאִם מִשֶּׁאָמַר ״תְּמוּרַת עוֹלָה״ נִמְלַךְ וְאָמַר ״תְּמוּרַת שְׁלָמִים״ — הֲרֵי זוֹ תְּמוּרַת עוֹלָה.

Rabbi Yosei said: If that was his intent from the outset, when he said that the animal is the substitute of the burnt offering, to state that the animal is also the substitute of the peace offering, then since it is impossible to call two designations simultaneously, i.e., one must first say one designation and then the other, his statement stands, and the animal is half a burnt offering and half a peace offering. And if it was only after he said: This animal is hereby the substitute of the burnt offering, that he reconsidered and said: The substitute of the peace offering, that entire animal is the substitute of the burnt offering.